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Defendants and Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VEIGH CUMMINGS and JoELLEN 
CUl\iMINGS, his wif~, 
Platn.tiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
J. ELMO ENGLAND, DeLOYD 
ENGLAND, AND BOYD ENG-
LAND, A partnership, doing busi-
ness under the name and style of 
ENGLAND BROTHERS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9344 
The facts set forth in opponents' brief are incomplete. 
For this reason, respondents believe it would be helpful 
to set forth a chronological statement of the occurrences 
here in question. 
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2 
In the month of :March, 1958 (Exhibit 28-D), the 
plaintiff, VEIGH CuMMINGs, on behalf of appellants, 
and J. ELMO EN;~LAND,; on behalf ?f respondents, be-
gan efforts to consummate an arrangement concerning 
a ranch located in Summit County which the respondents 
were purchasing from Y ern ~fills and Kenneth :Mills 
under a uniform real estate contract dated October 1, 1948 
(Exhibit 5-P), but the agreen1ent, which is the subject 
matter of this lawsuit and which was prepared by Earl 
~1. M:arshall, Attorney and Judge of· Tooele City, was 
not executed until M:ay 7, 1958 (R. 214 and Exhibit 7-P). 
It should be noted that ~fr. Cummings' contract, ho:wever, 
had the date of J\farch 26, 1958, filled in alihough no one 
seemed to know who had done this (Exhibit 6-P, R. 108, 
R. 214). At the ti:r~e the agreements were signed, ~Ir. 
Cummings had sheep as well as cattle on the premises 
but promised to remove the1n shortly (R. 94, R. 115, R. 
135, R. 136). .1\fr. Cumn1ings did not re1nove the sheep 
frmn the premises, however (R. 136), and, as 1night be 
expected, a conflict concerning the use of the two types 
of livestock developed (R. 93). This conflict resulted in 
Mr. Marshall advising ~h\ Cununings by letted dated 
October 8, 1958, that 1\fr. England 'Was exercising his 
option to pay off the smn that :Mr. Cunnnings hadin the 
subject ranch propert)' and was read)' and willing to pay 
this sun1 at the earliest date provided b)' the terms of 
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3 
the agreen1ent (Exhibit 1-P). One of the terms of the 
subject contract (Exhibit 7-P) provides for a mutual 
option to buy each other out "after 12 months from the 
date of execution" (page 3). 
On November 19, 1958, respondents exercised their 
option to terminate appellants' interest in the contract 
for failure of appellants to Inake the payment required 
of the1n on October 1, 1958, or withinn the 30-day grace 
period. (Exhibit 2-P) 
On April 28, 1959, the appellants attempted to exer-
cise their option to buy out respondents' interest in the 
subject property (Exhibit 3-P). On May 14, 1959, there-
spondents exercised their option to buy out the appellants 
pursuant to the terms of Exhibit 7 -P (Exhibits 4-P and 
19-D). On June 26, 1959, the parties agreed to sell the 
property involved in this contract to ·the Cottonwood 
Stake of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
without prejudice to the rights of either side with respect 
to the proceeds resulting from an interiffi division made 
by the parties. (Exhibit 25-D) 
On July 27, 1959, the property in question was sold 
to the Church for the sum of $75,000.00 (R. 66). 
On Septen1ber 11, 1959, respondents paid appellants 
their share of the property in accordance with the formula 
set forth in Exhibit 7 -P. (Exhibit 20-D, R. 23). 
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STATE~1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
DEFENDANTS MADE A VALID AND SUFFICIENT 
TENDER AND PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFFS TO PURCHASE 
THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS IN THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY. 
POINT 2. 
DEFENDANTS WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO PUR-
CHASE THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO 
THE OPTION TO DO SO IN 'THEIR CONTRACT AND THE 
GRANTING OF AN OPTION BY THE DEFENDANTS TO A 
THIRD PARTY TO PURCHASE 'THE ENTIRE INTEREST 
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WOULD NOT EFFECT THIS 
RIGHT, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
POINT 3. 
PLAINTIFFS FORFEITED THEIR INTERES'T IN THE 
CONTRACT OF MAY 7, 1958, BY FAILING TO MAKE THE 
PAYMENT DUE THEREUNDER ON OCTOBER 1, 1958, OR 
WITHIN THE 30-DA Y GRACE PERIOD THEREAFTER. 
ARGU~1ENT 
POINT 1. 
DEFENDANTS MADE A VALID AND SUFFICIENT 
TENDER AND PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFFS TO PURCHASE 
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THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS IN THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY. 
In the corresponding point of appellants' brief' it is 
contended that the su1n paid by respondents on Septem-
ber 11, 1959, of $1,597.79 was the net payment to the Mills 
on the.principal mnount owing out of the down payment 
of $3,000.00. This is not correct and the proper amount 
found necessary to exercise the option was found by the 
court in its memorandum decision. (R. 23) Defendants to 
be on the safe side, of course, granted an extra credit 
in order to be sure to cmnply with the principle of law 
enunciated in the cases set forth on page 9 of appellants' 
brief. The real question on this point is whether or not 
the sun1 tendered must be the full amount of money neces-
sary to exercise the option according to its terms or 
whether it must be this amount plus any other sum that 
may be due or ther~after found due to the tenderee by the 
tenderer for an obligation other than that arising out of 
the sun1 due to exercise the option. The Trial Court 
deci~ed that the option in this case required only the pay-
ment of the fonnula set forth in the contract, which is 
Exhibit 7 -P, and that the terms of the contract governed 
the sun1 which respondents were required to tender and 
pay to appellants. (R. 31, 32) None of the cases cited by 
appellants take the position that all accounts between 
the tenderer and tenderee n1ust be paid or offered to be 
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paid in order for a valid tender or exercise of an option 
to take place. 
POINT 2. 
DEFENDANTS WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO PUR-
CHASE THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO 
THE OPTION TO DO SO IN 'THEIR CONTRACT AND THE 
GRANTING OF AN OPTION BY THE DEFENDANTS TO A 
THIRD PARTY TO PURCHASE 'THE ENTIRE INTEREST 
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WOULD NOT EFFECT THIS 
RIGHT, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
None of the authorities cited by appellants under this 
corresponding point are applicable to the facts of this 
case because in none of those cases had the tenants in 
common contracted for an option whereby either could 
buy out the other, as was true in this case. In addition, 
the Utah case of Holland v. Morton on which appellants 
rely heavily involved a case ·where the highest type of 
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties in 
which one was acting as the agent and attorney for the 
other. In this case, neither party was acting as agent 
for the other and the court expressly found that no fidu-
ciary relationship existed between then1 (R. 22, 36). 
In the absence of any fiduciary relationship existing 
between the parties, it is difficult to understand upon 
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what tlwor~· appellants contend respondents had any duty 
to counnunicate to then1 any indications of an interest 
to purchase on behalf of third persons and of their re-
8ponse thereto, particularly when this occurred after 
a thne when respondents would reasonably believe that 
tlw interest of the appellants had been forfeited by fail-
ure to umke the payu1ent due October 1, 1958, and the 
letter written by Attorney ~1:arshall on thefr behalf sev-
eral months before. At the very least, it should have been 
obvious to appellants from Exhibits 1-P and 2-P as early 
as the latter part of November, 1958, that respondents in-
tended to acquire the entire interest in this property by 
purchase or forfeiture and could not expect to receive 
any counnunications that u1ight effect their joint or sev-
eral interests in this property. 
N" ow here in the evidence is there any indication that 
the Church paid more than the fair price for the farm 
in question. It should have been as apparent to the ap-
pellants as to the respondents that the value of the prop-
erty was greater at the time in question than the sum 
necessary to purchase it from the other party, especially 
when the appellants were in possession of the property 
and the respondents were not, so the failure of respond-
ents to cmnmunicate a particular fact which indicated 
that such wa~ the case could hardly have been detri-
mental. 
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In view of the fact that the option right was recripro-
cal, it is hardly to be expected that one party would com-
municate all offers to buy at a price in excess of the op-
tion price to the other in order to give the other a first 
opportunity to buy him out. 
The wisdom of such provisions in a contract as the 
mutual option here might be questionable, but the party 
who comes off second best can hardly expect the court to 
re-write the contract for him by alleging that the results 
of the "earlier bird getting the worm" are unconscion-
able, unfair and unreasonable. 
Equity cannot modify a contract or relieve a party 
thereto from contract's provision merely because con-
tract has the effect of placing the party in a less desir-
able position than he formerly occupied. Chikasaw Lum-
ber Co. v. Kunkel, 183 Old. 347, 82 P.2d 1003. 
It is difficult to understand how appellants can con-
tend that any grant of an option on the part of respond-
ents which they did not know about could effect either 
parties' legal right to enforce the contract they had 
entered into. If appellants atten1pted exercise of the 
sarne option (Exhibit 3-P) had not been premature as the 
result of this party being 1nistaken a~ to the date of the 
contract which incorporated this right, or if it had oc-
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<'lltTPd after l\la~· 7, 1959, could respondents have con-
tt·tHh·d ~ue<'e~~fully that this election had been vitiated by 
n·a~on of the possibilit~· that the undisclosed option might 
ripen into a contract favorable to both~ If extrinsic 
events, favorabl7' or unfavorable, can so radically alter 
the ten11:::; of written agreeinents between parties dealing 
at arms length ·with respect to the subject Inatter of 
their agremnent, what shall become of the sanetity of 
contracts~ 
POINT 3 
PLAINTIFFS FORFEITED THEIR INTEREST IN THE 
CONTRACT OF MAY 7, 1958, BY FAILING TO MAKE THE 
PAYMENT DUE THEREUNDER ON OCTOBER 1, 1958, OR 
WITHIN THE 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD THEREAFTER. 
There is no dispute in the evidence that appellants 
were obligated to pay the sum of $1,500.00 to Vern and 
l(enneth Mills on October 1, 1958, or within 30 days 
thereafter (Exhibit 7-P). Appellant Veigh Cumming's 
testimony is to the effect that it was only after the receipt 
of ~lr. Marshall's letter of November 19, 1958 (Exhibit 
2-P), that he n1ade a tender of the $1,500.00 to Mr. Eng-
land that he was required to pay on the contract (R. 115). 
The lower court excused this default on the ground that 
after ~[r. :Marshall's earlier letter, in which he advised 
that respondents were buying out appellants, there could 
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10 
be no forfeiture. Certainly, if appellants had ruled upon 
this earlier letter, it would be unconscionable to permit 
this, but there is no evidence in the record anywhere that 
this was the case. Appellants, in their brief (page 7), 
now take the position that since the court subsequently 
found that they ultimately were entitled to $1,754.11 as 
a result of expenditures by appellants for their joint 
operations, the payment due on October 1, 1958 need not 
have been made. 
Even if one party's failure to abide by one section 
of a contract could relieve the other party of the sanc-
tions set forth by the agreement for a violation of a dif-
ferent provision, it can readily been seen from Finding 
of Fact No. 7 of the Court ( R. 34, 35) that $1,771.07 of 
the expenses of which one half are chargeable to there-
spondents were paid after October 1, 1958, so appellants 
could not under any theory be excused from paying some 
part of the payment due that date. 
It is respectfully subn1itted that respondents effec-
tively acquired all of the interests of appellants by exer-
cise of their option as found by the trial court or through 
forfeiture of their interest by reason of the non-pay1nent 
of the installment due October 1, 1958. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should affinn the judgment of the trial 
court and award respondents their costs of court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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